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Abstract This chapter extends the deontic logic of Horty (Agency and deontic logic,
2001) in the direction of decision theory. Horty’s deontic operator, the dominance
ought, incorporates many concepts central to decision theory: acts, causal indepen-
dence, utilities and dominance reasoning. The decision theory associated with domi-
nance reasoning, however, is relatively weak. This chapter suggests that deontic logic
can usefully be viewed as proto-decision theory: it provides clear foundations and
a logical framework for developing norms of decision of varying strength. Within
Horty’s framework, deontic operators stronger than the dominance ought are defined
for decisions under ignorance, decisions under risk, and two-person zero-sum games.
1 Introduction: Decision Theory and Deontic Logic
Consider the following two decision problems.
Example 1 (Gambler): An agent, α, is offered a gamble. If she accepts, she pays
$5. A coin is then tossed: on Heads she wins $10; on Tails she wins nothing. If she
declines the gamble, she simply keeps her $5.
Example 2 (Matching Pennies): Two agents, α and β, simultaneously choose
whether to display a penny Heads up or Tails up. If the displayed sides of the two
pennies match, then α wins $1 from β. If the two sides do not match, then β wins $1
from α.
Assuming that these agents value money positively and that there are no relevant
external considerations, what should α do in these two scenarios? To find answers, we
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might look to two distinct normative frameworks: decision theory1 and deontic logic.
Decision theory, despite its many paradoxes and controversies, provides our most
successful formal account of rational choice. Deontic logic, with its own paradoxes
and controversies, offers an alternative way to think about what α ought to do.
What is the relationship between decision theory and deontic logic? We might
think of them as directed towards answering different questions. Decision theory
rests on sharp assumptions about preferences and belief, but also upon less clear
assumptions about causation, choice and counterfactuals. Deontic logic has no place
for probabilities or probabilistic reasoning and does not pretend to offer a compre-
hensive theory of rational choice. Yet both theories can be applied to examples like
Gambler and Matching Pennies. This suggests that they might, in some way, be
rivals.
There is a third possibility. Rather than see them as unrelated or as rivals, we might
regard deontic logic as a kind of proto-decision theory. Conceived in this way, deontic
logic would play three roles. First, it would provide a rigorous logical framework for
decision theory, a framework that clarifies foundational assumptions about causation,
choice, counterfactuals and other relevant concepts. Second, stronger and weaker
systems of deontic logic would be definable in this common framework. Third and
finally, these systems of deontic logic would also be rudimentary decision theories:
they would provide norms for choices by agents that are compatible with basic
principles of decision theory.
When deontic logic is viewed in this way, the approach developed by Horty
(2001) is exemplary. Horty’s deontic logic (in contrast to many earlier approaches) is
prescriptive: it is about choices by agents. It proposes semantics for what a particular
agent ought to do at a particular moment in time. Horty’s framework is built on top
of Belnap’s modal logic of agency, stit theory, a clear and rigorous logical and
metaphysical account of agents making choices in indeterministic branching time.2
Stit theory already takes us part way to causal decision theory because it incorporates
causal notions: agents, branching time and a formulation of causal independence.
Horty takes us further by incorporating utilities and dominance reasoning into his
account, although he does not introduce probabilistic concepts. Still, his deontic
logic does provide a weak decision theory: under reasonable assumptions, the set of
obligations for an agent on the Horty semantics is a subset of the set of obligations
that the agent has according to any sound principle of decision theory.
The main thesis of this chapter is that Horty’s approach can be fruitfully enriched,
first by a slight generalization of his account of causal independence and second by
adding a ‘thin’ layer of probabilistic concepts.3 The result is a framework in which
deontic logic is even better suited to serve as proto-decision theory by playing the
1 By ‘decision theory’ I mean to include the theory of decisions under ignorance, decisions under
risk and normative game theory.
2 This account is developed by Belnap and others in a series of articles, many of which are reprinted
in (Belnap et al. 2001).
3 In a similar spirit, Kooi and Tamminga (2008) show how Horty’s framework can be supplemented
to engage with game theory (though without introducing probabilistic ideas).
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three roles mentioned above. There may be good reasons not to introduce full-blooded
probability into the stit universe.4 But it is plausible to introduce probabilities for
mixed strategies by agents, and more generally for chance mechanisms (such as coin
tosses and dice rolls). Horty’s deontic logic can then be expanded fruitfully towards
different branches of decision theory.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic ideas of stit
(seeing-to-it-that). Section 3 proposes a generalization of Horty’s account of causal
independence. Horty’s Dominance Ought is reviewed in Sect. 4, along with a slight
modification corresponding to the generalization of Sect. 3. The remaining sec-
tions explore expansions of Horty’s deontic framework to decisions under ignorance
(Sect. 5), decisions under risk (Sect. 6) and elementary game theory (Sect. 7). While
the focus of the chapter is on endowing deontic logic with resources from decision
theory, I conclude with a brief discussion of return benefits for decision theory.
2 Seeing to it That (stit)
In a series of articles, Belnap and others have proposed semantics for the modal
construction, “α sees to it that A,” or [ α stit: A] for short. To keep things brief, I
pass over the philosophical motivation and simply review concepts that are crucial
for this chapter. The best single source of information on stit is the volume of articles
(Belnap et al. 2001).
2.1 Semantics for cstit with One Agent
There are three accounts of [ α stit: A] on offer: the Belnap “achievement stit” (astit),
the Horty/von Kutschera “deliberative stit” (dstit) and the “Chellas stit” (cstit). Since
the latter is employed by Horty in his deontic logic, this section presents, in cursory
form, only the semantics for the Chellas stit, following notation that borrows from
both (Belnap et al. 2001) and (Horty 2001).5 The fundamental idea of [ α cstit: A]
is that A is guaranteed by a present choice of agent α ([ α dstit: A] is more complex
because it requires this same positive condition, together with the negative condition
that A is not ‘settled-true’ in the sense of (3) below).
The framework begins with an indeterministic branching time structure
< T ree, < >, where Tree is a non-empty set of moments, m, and < is a tree-
like partial ordering of those moments. A history, h, in Tree is a maximal chain of
moments, i.e., a complete temporal evolution of the world. If m is a moment, write
4 Belnap et al. (2001) consider and reject the idea that “α sees to it that A” should be modelled
as “α’s choice guarantees a high probability for A”; Broersen develops this very notion in (2011)
and elsewhere. In this chapter, I am concerned not with a probabilistic version of stit but with the
importance of probabilities for norms of choice.
5 Both dstit and cstit have been useful in deontic logic (Belnap et al. 2001). On dstit versus cstit as
an analysis of seeing-to-it-that, see (Chellas 1992) and (Horty 2001).
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Fig. 1 Histories A A A ~A A A
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 
m 2 m 3 m 4
m
Hm = {h/m ∈ h} for the set of all histories containing (passing through) m. The
situation is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the upward direction represents later moments.
In the picture, Hm = {h1, . . . , h6}, while Hm2 = {h1, h2, h3}. The histories h1
and h2 are undivided at m because they share a later moment (m2) in common; the
histories h1 and h4 are divided at m.
Sentences are constructed from propositional variables A, B, ... using the following
operators:
(i) Truth-functional operators: ∼,∨ (with abbreviations ∧,⊃,≡)
(ii) Necessity operators: Universally:, Settled:
(iii) Tense operators: Will: and Was:
(vi) Agentive operator: [ α cstit: __] where α denotes an individual agent
The truth of sentences is evaluated relative to a moment-history pair m/h, where
m is a moment belonging to history h. A model M pairs the tree structure with an
interpretation that maps each propositional variable A to a set of m/h pairs where A
is true:
(1) M, m/h |= A iff A is true at m/h.
In Fig. 1, for example, M, m2/h1 |= A while M, m3/h4  A. The clauses for the
truth-functional operators are standard. For the modal operators, Universally: rep-
resents truth throughout Tree, while Settled: represents truth throughout a moment.
The relevant clauses are as follows:
(2) M, m/h |= Universally: A iff M, m′/h′ |= A for all m′/h′ in T ree
(3) M, m/h |= Settled: A iff M, m/h′ |= A for all h′ with m ∈ h′
For the tense operators, we have
(4) M, m/h |= Will : A iff M, m′/h |= A for some m′ in h with
m < m′
(5) M, m/h |= Was: A iff M, m′/h |= A for some m′ < m.
In Fig. 1, Will: A is true at m/h1 but false at m/h4. Settled: A is true at m2/h1 but
false at m3/h5.
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Finally, we come to [ α cstit: A]. This requires enriching the branching time
framework of < T ree,< > with a nonempty set AGENT of agents (denoted α, β,
and so forth) and a function Choice that represents choices by agents. The most
important idea is that of a choice set for α at moment m, which is a partition of the
histories passing through m into choice cells (or simply choices) for α. α’s power of
choice consists in “constraining the course of events to lie within some definite subset
of the possible histories still available”. (Belnap et al. 2001, 33). That is, choice is
identified with the selection of one cluster of histories. The agent picks the cluster,
but cannot select a unique history within the choice cell. All of this is formalized in
the following definitions.
(6) stit frames.
A stit frame < T ree, <, AG E N T , Choice > is a structure with Tree and
< as above, AGENT a nonempty set of agents, and Choice a function mapping
agent α and moment m into a partition of Hm characterized as follows:
• Choicemα is a partition of Hm into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets.
• Each member of Choicemα is called a choice cell (or choice) for α at m
• h and h′ are choice-equivalent f or α at m(written h′ ≡αm h) if they belong
to the same choice cell for α at m (no choice that α can make at m tells them
apart).
Choice is subject to the following condition (and one further condition, Weak Inde-
pendence of Agents, to be described shortly):
(7) No Choice between Undivided Histories.
If h and h′ are undivided at m, then h and h′ must belong to the same choice cell
for α at m.
A choice by some agent is the most obvious means by which histories are divided.
Histories also divide as the result of chance processes in Nature. A coin toss serves
as a paradigm example.
With this apparatus on board, we can define what it is for [ α cstit: A] to hold at
m/h:
(8) M, m/h |= [α csti t: A] iff A is true at (m, h′) for all h′ with h′ ≡αm h. (By
choosing the cell containing h, α guarantees that A is true as A holds on all
histories consistent with α’s choice.)
Figure 2 provides the basic picture. In the picture, m is a moment in Tree that has
been blown up to reveal the choice structure. The three boxes represent choice cells
for α at m; each history in Hm belongs to exactly one box. The truth-value of A is
shown for each moment–history pair. Here, [ α cstit: A] holds just at m/h1 and m/h2
(Note that [α csti t : ∼A] is false throughout m; there is no law of excluded middle
for seeing-to-it-that).
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Fig. 2 [ α cstit: A] A A ~A A ~A A
h 1 h 2 h 3 h 4 h 5 h 6
c1 c2 c3 m
Fig. 3 Multiple agents A A ~A ~A




b2 ~ ~A A
a1 a2
α
2.2 Multiple Agents: Independence and Joint Agency
The concept of cstit generalizes to groups of agents. Most of the ideas can be made
clear by considering just two agents, α and β, making simultaneous choices. The
simplest way to represent this is once again with a blown-up picture of the moment,
this time two-dimensional, with the choices of α represented on the horizontal axis
and the choices of β on the vertical axis, as in Fig. 3.
Here,α andβ face non-trivial choices, formally specified by choice sets (partitions)
Choicemα and Choicemβ . In the picture, the possible choices are a1 and a2 for α, and
b1 and b2 for β; thus, the choice sets are {a1, a2} and {b1, b2}.
The key assumption made by Belnap and Perloff is that every combination of
choices by α and β is possible:
(9) [Weak] Independence of Agents.
For each moment and for each way of selecting one choice for every agent (in
the set AGENT) from among that agent’s set of possible choices at that moment,
the intersection of all the choices selected must contain at least one history.
To formalize this condition, we follow Horty in defining a selection function s at
moment m to be a mapping from AGENT into Hm that selects one action for each
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agent: s(α) ∈ Choicemα for each α. Let Selectm be the set of all such functions. We
re-state (9) as follows:
For each moment m and each selection function s in Selectm ,
⋂
α∈AG E N T
s(α) 	= φ.
Belnap comments (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 218) that while Independence is a “fierce”
constraint (implying, for example, that no two agents can have the same possible
choices at the same moment), it is also fairly weak (“banal” is Belnap’s term): it would
be strange indeed if without causal priority, one agent’s choices could constrain what
the other agent may choose.
The other important idea is joint agency. Again, the basic idea can be explained
with just two agents. Let  = {α, β}, where α and β are distinct agents. We want to
define truth conditions for [ csti t : A]. The concept is illustrated by referring once
again to Fig. 3. With the assignments given by our model M, neither α nor β can see
to it that A on any history in m. However, M, m/h1 |= [ stit: A] because A holds
at every history h′ that belongs to the choice cell containing h1 that is determined
jointly by α and β. The formal definition is the same as (8) except that the condition
invokes equivalence within the choice cell determined jointly by the agents in .
3 Causal Independence
Both causal decision theory and Horty’s deontic logic depend upon the concept of
causal independence. Before examining how causal independence can be character-
ized in the stit framework, it is helpful to review its role in causal decision theory. I
focus on the formulation due to Skyrms (1980).6
Skyrms’s formulation requires the identification of a set of independent causal
factors that provide the background for an agent’s choices. Each independent causal
factor is represented as a random variable Xi . For simplicity’s sake, suppose that
the set of possible outcomes O1, . . ., On of interest to the agent is finite, that the set
X1, . . . , X N of independent factors relevant to these possible outcomes is also finite,
and that each variable Xi can take on finitely many values. Then the set S consisting
of all possible combinations of assignments to these variables is also finite. This set
constitutes a partition of the set of possible worlds into causal background contexts
or states S1, . . . , SM : each state Si is obtained by specifying one possible value for
each of X1, . . . , X N . Suppose that the agent has a finite set {K1, . . ., Km} of available
alternative acts. The crucial idea is that the causal factors in conjunction with these
alternative acts determine relevant conditional chances of the possible outcomes: the
6 There are numerous formulations of causal decision theory, including (Gibbard and Harper 1978),
(Skyrms 1980) and (Joyce 1999). (Skyrms 1980) is in some ways the simplest and most relevant to
our present concerns.
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conditional chances P(Ok / Ki ∧ S j ) are constant within each Ki ∧ S j . Finally, the
agent assigns a utility u(Ok ∧ Ki ∧ S j ) to each outcome-act-state combination.
For a standard example, let Ki be the selection of a ball from one of m urns, let
O1, . . ., On represent n different colours of ball that may be drawn, and let S1, . . ., SM
stand for M possible initial arrangements of coloured balls in the m urns. Then
the probability P(Ok / Ki ∧ S j ) is the conditional chance of drawing a ball of
colour Ok , given arrangement S j and the act Ki of drawing from urn i. The utility
u(Ok ∧ Ki ∧ S j ) depends upon the desirability of each combination (perhaps the
agent has placed a bet in advance).
To allow for cases in which the agent is uncertain about the background context,
Skyrms introduces a subjective probability distribution prob(S j ) over all of the
states. In the urn example, this represents your initial credence about the likelihoods
of the different possible arrangements. The expected utility of act Ki is then given
by the formula
(10) Expected utility.
U (Ki ) =  j prob(S j )k P(Ok/Ki ∧ S j ) · u(Ok ∧ Ki ∧ S j ).
The thesis of causal decision theory is that a rational agent maximizes expected utility
as given by (10). The equation highlights the importance of independent causal factors
in the theory; the outer summation is over all possible states.7
Horty’s deontic logic has a similar, but much weaker, guiding principle. Without
conditional chances or credences, his analysis (outlined in the next section) is based
solely upon the concept of dominance. Yet dominance reasoning shares with causal
decision theory the need for a set of independent causal factors and a corresponding
set of causal background contexts. Stit frames help to make these things precise
by providing a concrete interpretation of possible worlds and a plausible way to
identify some of the independent causal factors. I first review Horty’s account and
then propose a slight generalization.
Horty begins with an informal explication of causal independence:
...the basic intuition … is that a proposition is supposed to be causally independent of the
actions available to a particular agent whenever its truth or falsity is guaranteed by a source
of causality other than the actions of that agent. (2001, 82)
Recall postulate (9), Weak Independence of Agents: if agents in a group make simul-
taneous choices, then the intersection of the relevant choice sets is non-empty. Horty
strengthens this in two ways. First, he assumes that all choices at m by agents other
than α are independent causal factors for α’s choice at m. This strengthened assump-
tion, stated in counterfactual terms, applies to all moment–history pairs m/h and all
agents α.
7 In this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the element of subjective probability repre-
sented by prob. Skyrms (1994) provides a good discussion. In the present framework, subjective
probability could usefully be introduced to represent the agent’s uncertainty about location, i.e.,
about which m is the moment of decision.
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(11) Strong Independence (of Agents).
Let S represent the intersection of all actual choices (i.e., choice cells) of all
agents other than α at m/h. If α were to make a different choice than the one
made at m/h, the other agents would still (collectively) choose S.
Second, Horty adopts a provisional simplifying assumption that I shall refer to as
Causal Completeness of AGENT.
(12) Causal Completeness (of AGENT).
Choices by agents in AG E N T \{α} (i.e., agents other than α) are the only
independent causal factors relevant to α’s choice.
Taken together, the two assumptions imply that the independent causal factors for
α’s choice are precisely choices by other agents.
To illustrate these ideas, consider Fig. 3 again. Suppose that the picture represents
choices by two agents, α and β, to cooperate in moving a heavy box at moment m. At
m/h1 and m/h2, the box is successfully moved (represented by the proposition A).
Here, α chooses a1 and β chooses b1. The choice by β is causally independent of the
choice by α (by Strong Independence): if α were to choose a2 (don’t cooperate) at
m, then β would still choose b1. Further, this is the only relevant independent causal
factor for α’s choice (by Causal Completeness).
What defense can we give for assumptions (11) and (12)? For the first, the argu-
ment is that from Weak Independence of Agents and the simultaneity of choices by
other agents, it is reasonable to infer Strong Independence. Simultaneous choices by
agents must be causally independent of each other and of α’s choices at m.8 By con-
trast, Causal Completeness is offered merely as a useful “initial approximation” for
Horty’s deontic logic. Horty explicitly identifies two sources of independent causal
influence that are not reflected in his account: “nonagentive sources” (Nature) and
later choices by agents other than α (Horty 2001, 89–95). While I agree with Horty
that fully to incorporate these influences into the analysis would be a “substantial
research task”, I believe that important special cases can be accommodated without
great difficulty.
Consider first the case of Nature. Figure 4 illustrates a version of Example 1
(Gambler), described at the start of this chapter.9 At moment m, α has a choice of
gambling (G) or not. The gamble costs $5. A fair coin toss is to be performed at m
whether or not α gambles. If the coin comes up Heads(H), α leaves with $10, but on
Tails (T) she gets nothing. If α declines the gamble, she keeps her $5. The outcomes
8 Talk of simultaneity suggests that there might be some gain in clarity by moving to a framework of
branching space-time (Belnap 1992) instead of branching time. The added complexity of branching
space-time is unnecessary, however, since for present purposes simultaneity is adequately charac-
terized in a branching-time framework in terms of condition (7), No Choice between Undivided
Histories. That is, it suffices that there exists a moment m such that for each agent, histories within
the relevant choice cells are undivided at m while histories belonging to different choice cells are
divided at m.
9 The Gambler example is due to Horty (2001), who formulates and discusses a number of versions.
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Fig. 4 Gambler (I) W W N N
h 1 h 2 h 3 h 4
H
h 5 N h 7
h 6 L N h 8
T L
G ~G m     
α
are as shown, where W signifies a win, L a loss and N the status quo where α neither
wins nor loses.
There are no other agents besides α in this picture.10 Yet the coin toss has the
characteristics of an independent causal factor. It occurs simultaneously with α’s
choice. It satisfies an analogue of Weak Independence: any choice by α is compatible
with either result, Heads or Tails. Finally, it is reasonable to regard the coin toss as
satisfying Strong Independence. Consider
(13) If α had gambled, he would have won.
We endorse the truth of (13) at m/h3 and m/h4, and its falsity at m/h7 and m/h8.
To summarize these observations, we introduce a random variable Toss with values
{Heads, Tails}. With respect to both Weak Independence and Strong Independence,
Toss has characteristics analogous to those of an agent with choice set {Heads, Tails}.
The generalization proposed here is to extend Horty’s account of causal indepen-
dence to include not just agents but also chance mechanisms operating simultane-
ously with α’s choice. By chance mechanisms, I mean well-understood processes
such as those employed in games of chance: coin tosses, dice rolls, card drawings
and so forth. These are singled out for two reasons. First, such processes have out-
comes with well-defined and unproblematic probabilities.11 Second, these processes
are crucial in defining mixed strategies, which will be important later in this chapter.
Each such mechanism can be modeled as a random variable X that may take differ-
ent possible values X = xi at the moment m, i.e., at distinct moment history pairs
m/h and m/h′. Let VAR be the set of independent variables representing chance
processes.12 We shall make assumptions about VAR that are entirely parallel to those
for AGENT.
10 It may be that agent β tosses the coin, but β does not choose the result Heads or Tails. So the
clusters shown are not choice sets for β.
11 Gillies (2000) argues that such processes have a distinguished role in accounts of objective chance.
In particular, the problem of identifying an appropriate reference class is relatively insignificant.
12 We could relativize to each moment, using VARm for the set of variables that represent chance
processes operating at m. We avoid this relativization both because we shall only ever be concerned
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First, each random variable X must satisfy an analogue of the No Choice Between
Undivided Histories condition, representing the fact that the chance process operates
at moment m (rather than at a later moment). A pair of definitions makes this clear.
(14) Rngm(X).
By analogy with Choicemα , if X is a random variable, define rngm(X) as the
partition of Hm corresponding to the possible values X = xi at m. (Two his-
tories h1 and h2 belong to the same element of rngm(X) if for some xi , both
M, m/h1 |= X = xi and M, m/h2 |= X = xi .) For simplicity, we shall
assume that these values xi are always real numbers.13
(15) No Separation of Undivided Histories.
Whenever h1 and h2 are undivided at m, X has the same value X = xi at
both m/h1 and m/h2. That is, h1 and h2 must belong to the same element of
rngm(X).
Condition (15) rules out random variables that partition Hm based on future processes.
Next, we need analogues for (9) Weak Independence and (10) Strong Indepen-
dence. We want these analogues to apply to agents and chance processes taken
together, which motivates the following definitions.
(16) FACTOR.
FACTOR is the union of VAR and the set of random variables representing
choices by agents:
FACTOR = AG E N T ∪ VAR
(17) Extended Selection Function.
An extended selection function s at moment m is a mapping from FACTOR
into Hm that selects a choice in Choicemα for each agent α in AGENT, and an
element of rngm(X) for each variable X in VAR.
As before, we use the notation Selectm for the set of all such functions.
It is sometimes convenient to regard the agents in AGENT as random variables,
and to represent Choicemα as rngm(α). This allows us to state a compact analogue
of (9):
(Footnote 12 continued)
with a single moment and to maintain the analogy with AGENT, the set of agents fixed over all
moments.
13 For the purposes of this chapter and to maintain consistency with the definitions in Sect. 2, we
assume that all statements X = xi can be represented in our language as propositional constants.
My thanks to Thomas Müller for pointing this out.
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(18) Weak Independence of FACTOR.




We also have an obvious formulation of Strong Independence:
(19) Strong Independence of FACTOR.





where s(Y ) is the element of rngm(Y ) selected for Y at m/h. If a different value
X = x j were selected at m, the other variable values and hence the background
state S would remain the same.
[In particular, if any agent α were to make a different choice, all choices by
other agents and all variable values would remain the same].14
On this account, causal independence extends to chance mechanisms that operate
independently of each other and of agents, such as the coin toss in Gambler (I). We
acknowledge this modification by extending our earlier definition of stit frames.
(20) Extended stit frames.
An extended stit frame is a structure < T ree,<, FACTOR, Rng > that satisfies
all earlier assumptions as well as (15), (18) and (19).
We are not quite done. A separate approach is needed to represent chance mechanisms
initiated by agents. Consider a variation of Gambler: α tosses the coin if and only if
she accepts the gamble; if she declines, there is no coin toss (Fig. 5).
In this case, it is inappropriate to model Toss as an independent causal factor.
There is no independent partition of Hm ; the toss does not happen if α declines to
gamble. So both Weak Independence and Strong Independence fail.
The difficulty is that while Gambler (II) involves a well-understood chance mech-
anism that (to paraphrase Horty) represents a source of causality other than the actions
of α, the mechanism does not operate independently of α and cannot be modelled as
a random variable in VAR. An alternative approach, following Skyrms, is to represent
14 Note that the plausibility of (19) depends upon the modest scope of the set VAR. The stated
(though still undeniably vague) restriction is that the random variables in VAR are restricted to well-
understood chance mechanisms, the sort of mechanisms that one could exploit in implementing a
mixed strategy (see Sect. 7). In particular, I mean to exclude quantum phenomena.
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Fig. 5 Gambler (II) W W N N
h 1 h 2 h 3 h 4
h 5 L N h 7
h 6 L N h 8




the operation of such mechanisms via conditional chances for outcomes within each
causal background context. This approach will be developed below in Sect. 6.
4 Horty’s Dominance Ought
Consider Gambler (I), as illustrated in Fig. 4. Substitute numerical values 10 in place
of W (a winning gamble), 0 in place of L (a loss), and 5 in place of N (no gamble).
These values represent the money that agent α possesses when the dust settles. We
can also think of them as utilities that represent α’s preferences.
Adding utilities to a stit frame gives us a utilitarian stit frame, defined by Horty
as a structure of the form
< T ree, <, AG E N T, Choice, V alue >,
where T ree,<, AG E N T and Choice are as in Sect. 2, and Value is a function that
assigns a real number V alue(h) to each history. A utilitarian stit model combines
a utilitarian stit frame with an assignment of truth values to propositions. Figure 6
illustrates Gambler (I) in a utilitarian stit model.
Horty provides a semantics for statements of the form
[α cstit: A] (α ought to see to it that A).15
The basic idea of his “dominance ought” is that α ought to see to it that A iff A
is guaranteed by each optimal (non-dominated) choice. It takes care to make this
15 Horty uses  to distinguish his dominance ought from other obligation operators. I shall use
 · and ≺· to represent the corresponding dominance relations, described below. This helps to
distinguish Horty’s dominance ordering from variants to be introduced in later sections.
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precise and to handle cases where there are no optimal choices. The elements of
Horty’s account include background states, a value ordering on propositions at m
(subsets of Hm), and the dominance relation between possible choices for an agent.
(21) Dominance ordering on choices.
• Statemα : the partition of histories through m into background causal contexts
S for α’s choice. For Horty, as we have seen, these background contexts are
simply joint choices by all members of AGENT other than α.
• Ordering relations (≤ and <) on propositions at moment m: If X and Y are
two subsets of Hm , then (1) X ≤ Y if V alue(h) ≤ V alue(h′) for each h ∈ X
and h′ ∈ Y, and (2) X < Y if X ≤ Y and in addition, V alue(h) < V alue(h′)
for some h ∈ X and h′ ∈ Y .
• Dominance relations (· and ≺·) on Choicemα : If K and K ′ are members of
Choicemα (i.e., possible choices for α at m), then (1) K · K ′ (K ′ weakly
dominates K) if K ∩ S ≤ K ′ ∩ S for each state S in Statemα , and (2) K ≺· K ′
(K ′ strongly dominates K) if K · K ′ and, in addition, K ∩ S < K ′ ∩ S for
some state S in Statemα .
• Optimal acts. If K ∈ Choicemα is a possible act for α at m, and there is no
K ′ ∈ Choicemα such that K ≺· K ′, then K is an optimal act for α at m.
To illustrate these ideas, imagine that in Fig. 6, the result Heads or Tails is deter-
mined by another agent, β. In this case, Statemα is {Heads, Tails}, and (G & Tails)
< ∼G < (G & Heads) on the propositional ordering. Neither [α cstit: G] nor
[α cstit: ∼G] is a dominated act for α, so both are optimal.
In simple cases where α has only finitely many possible choices, Horty’s account
of obligation is as follows:
(22) Horty Dominance Ought (Finite Choice case).
M, m/h |= [α cstit: A] iff M, m/h′ |= A for all h′ belonging to any choice
K that is optimal at m.
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That is, α ought to see to it that A iff every optimal choice guarantees A. In the case
of Gambler, the Horty account tells us that neither [α cstit: G] nor [α cstit: ∼G]
is true. In the absence of probabilistic information, gambling and not gambling are
both permitted.
There may be situations where α has infinitely many options, none of which is
optimal. For instance, if α and β are playing the greatest integer game, where the
person who names the largest integer wins, then there is no optimal choice. In such
cases, there are still dominated choices and hence there are still obligations—for
instance, the obligation to choose an integer greater than 1,000. To accommodate
such cases, Horty provides a more general evaluation rule.
(23) Horty Dominance Ought (general case).
M, m/h |= [α csti t : A] iff for each choice K ∈ Choicemα that does not
guarantee A, there is a choice K ′ ∈ Choicemα such that (1) K ≺· K ′ (K ′
strongly dominates K), (2) M, m/h′ |= A for all h′ belonging to K ′, and (3)
for every choice K ′′ ∈ Choicemα such that K ′ · K ′′, M, m/h′′ |= A for all
h′′ belonging to K ′′.
The requirement for [α csti t : A] is that any action K that does not guarantee A is
dominated by an action K ′ that does guarantee A and is either optimal or dominated
only by other actions that guarantee A.
Suppose we modify Gambler so that the values are as shown in Fig. 7. Once again,
we imagine that the result Heads or Tails is determined by the choice of another agent,
β, so that the background states for α’s choice are {Heads, Tails}.
As before, gambling is not always better than not gambling: the value of h3 and
h4 exceeds that of h5 and h6. But this time, the act of gambling dominates the act of
not gambling, so that [α csti t : G] is true at m.16
As a slight modification of Horty’s account, let us bring in the generalization of
causal independence introduced in the extended stit frames of Sect. 3. Suppose that,
in Fig. 7, the result Heads or Tails is determined by a chance mechanism (a coin toss)
rather than by another agent’s choice. Since Horty’s causal background contexts
only take into account choices by other agents, his account gives us no partition
between Heads and Tails, no dominance of [α csti t : G] over [α csti t : ∼G], and
hence no obligation to gamble. The extension of AGENT to FACTOR, as explained in
Sect. 3, remedies this problem by counting chance mechanisms such as coin tosses
as independent causal factors on par with choices. If we allow this extension, then
Statemα = {Heads, T ails} in Fig. 7, which restores the dominance reasoning that
leads to [α csti t : G]. Henceforth, · and  will be understood as incorporating this
extended concept of factors and background states. Other than the change to Statemα ,
there is no formal modification required for definitions (21), (22) and (23).17
16 Technically, true at all m, h pairs. Since the semantics guarantees that [α csti t : G] is either
settled true or settled false at a moment, however, we may speak of obligations as holding at a
moment.
17 We could similarly define extended utilitarian stit frames by substituting FACTOR for AGENT
and Rng for Choice.
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The distinctive feature of Horty’s approach, in contrast to a great deal of earlier
work in deontic logic, is that his semantics for obligation is based on an ordering on
choices, rather than an ordering on histories or worlds. Horty’s deontic logic gives
us a weak decision theory, namely, the part of decision theory that corresponds to
dominance reasoning. Let us say that an ordering  on choices K in Choicemα is
admissible if it extends Horty’s dominance ordering: K  K ′ whenever K · K ′.
Any decision principle based upon an admissible ordering on choices will preserve
obligations that hold according to the dominance ought. But the reverse is not true:
stronger decision principles justify assertions of obligation that fail on the Horty
semantics. The remainder of this chapter shows how three of these stronger decision
principles, and the corresponding notions of obligation, can be modeled by extensions
within Horty’s framework.
5 Decisions Under Ignorance: The Maximin Ought
In this section, I show how Horty’s account might be extended to incorporate a
principle that is sometimes used for making decisions under ignorance: maximin.
The maximin rule tells the agent to compare minimum utilities possible for each
available act, and to choose the act with the maximal minimum utility. The rationale
behind this rule is conservatism: by following maximin, the agent guarantees the least
bad outcome. In Gambler (I), for instance, the choice “Don’t Gamble” guarantees
a utility of 5, while “Gamble” allows possible outcomes with utilities of 0 and 10.
Maximin thus prescribes the choice of not gambling. By contrast, as we have just
seen, Horty’s dominance ought prescribes nothing, since both gambling and not
gambling are optimal choices.
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There is an important ambiguity in the phrase “decisions under ignorance.” Com-
monly, such decisions are characterized as those made “when it makes no sense to
assign probabilities to the outcomes emanating from one or more of the acts” (Resnik
1987, 14). We can distinguish between cases of total ignorance, where the agent has
no probabilistic information at all (not even knowledge of independence), and igno-
rance of probabilities, where the agent has no quantitative probabilistic information
but does possess knowledge of causal independence. The latter case, in which the
agent has exactly the same information as required for the dominance ought, is our
focus. The objective is to provide a semantics for maximin ought-to-do, Om , that
strengthens Horty’s dominance ought in the following sense:
(24) [α csti t : A] |= Om[α csti t : A].
Both operators are formulated within utilitarian stit frameworks. The meaning of
(24) is that for any utilitarian stit model M and for any m, h pair, if M, m/h |=
[α csti t : A] then M, m/h |= Om[α csti t : A].
Unfortunately, our preliminary statement of the maximin rule is inconsistent with
Horty’s dominance ought. To see this, consider a kid-friendly version of Gambler
that rewards a decision to gamble with $10 if Heads, $5 if Tails; a decision not to
gamble yields $5 regardless of outcome.18 Gambling is plainly the dominant act.
Yet the simple maximin rule regards gambling and not gambling as equally good
because the worst outcome on either choice is $5. This violation of dominance can
be avoided by moving to a lexical version of maximin,19 but an alternative approach
will be offered below.
Another weakness of maximin as stated is its inability to handle a situation of infi-
nite choices, such as the greatest integer game discussed in the preceding section.
Even though no available act attains a maximal minimum value, it seems clear
that maximin reasoning should license many of the same conclusions as dominance
reasoning—for instance, that one ought to select an integer greater than 1,000.
We proceed in stages, starting with a new ordering on choices that combines
maximin with the dominance ordering  · defined in (21). The idea is to apply
maximin only to pairwise comparisons where neither choice dominates the other.
(25) Non-dominance. If K and K ′ are members of Choicemα (i.e., possible choices
for α at m), write K |≶ K ′ if neither K · K ′ nor K ′ · K .
(26) Maximin ordering (m and ≺m) on Choicemα :
If K and K ′ are members of Choicemα (i.e., possible choices for α at m), then
(1) K m K ′ if (i) K · K ′ or (ii) K |≶ K ′ and in f {V al(h)/h ∈ K } ≤
in f {V al(h′)/h′ ∈ K ′}; and
18 Kid-friendly because the gambler never loses any money.
19 See (Resnik 1987).
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(2) K ≺m K ′ if (i) K ≺ ·K ′ or (ii) K |≶ K ′ and in f {V al(h)/h ∈ K } <
in f {V al(h′)/h′ ∈ K ′}.20
(27) Maximin ought, Om .
M, m/h |= Om[α csti t : A] iff for each choice K ∈ Choicemα that does not
guarantee A, there is a choice K ′ ∈ Choicemα such that (1) K ≺m K ′, (2)
M, m/h′ |= A for all h′ belonging to K ′, and (3) for every choice K ′′ ∈
Choicemα such that K ′ m K ′′, M, m/h′′ |= A for all h′′ belonging to K ′′.
The relationship (24), that [α csti t : A] entails Om[α csti t : A], is clear because
dominance is built into the definition of Om . By way of example: in the kid-friendly
version of Gambler, there is an obligation to gamble because gambling dominates
not gambling. In the original version of Gambler (illustrated in Fig. 6) there is no
dominant choice, but not gambling is superior to gambling on the maximin ordering;
as a consequence, the agent has an obligation not to gamble (Om[α csti t : ∼G]). The
same result holds when the result of Heads or Tails is achieved through placement of
the coin by an independent agent. Finally, consider an infinite choice situation such
as the Greatest Integer Game, where each possible choice of an integer is dominated
by any choice of a larger integer. By (27), it is still true that one ought to choose an
integer larger than 1,000.
The formulation of maximin ought in (27) has some advantages over the tra-
ditional formulation of maximin in decision theory. The first is its compatibility
with dominance reasoning. The standard version of maximin, as noted earlier, does
not always exclude dominated choices; the same problem applies to some forms
of lexical maximin reasoning.21 Other versions of lexical maximin, which respect
dominance, are defined only for finite choice situations. By contrast, (27) is defined
for arbitrary choice situations and is always compatible with dominance reasoning.
A second advantage of the present formulation, indeed, is its ability to accommo-
date infinite choice situations, as noted in the preceding paragraph. In infinite choice
situations where no individual choice is rational, we can still identify obligations.
This highlights a general advantage of locating decision principles within deontic
logic: whereas decision theory is focused specifically on rational acts, deontic logic
provides truth conditions for all sentences of the form Om[α csti t : A].
The point of this discussion is not to endorse the maximin ought over Horty’s
dominance ought. The weaknesses of maximin reasoning are well known.22 There
are two motives for developing Om . The first is simply to flesh out the claim that the
Horty semantics can be strengthened to yield a stronger decision theory. The second
is that maximin reasoning plays an important role in game theory (Sect. 7).
20 If S is a set of real numbers that is bounded below, then inf (S) refers to the infimum or greatest
lower bound of S. Thus, I assume that the set of utility values within each K is bounded. The
assumption of bounded utilities is standard in decision theory, to avoid problems such as the St.
Petersburg paradox (see Resnik 1987, p. 107). Here, we require only the weaker assumption that
utilities are bounded below within each possible choice.
21 See (Resnik 1987).
22 See (Resnik 1987) for discussion.
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6 Decision Under Risk: Probabilistic Utilitarian stit Frames
This section extends Horty’s account in a different direction by incorporating a simple
type of probabilistic information – that which is related to chance mechanisms — into
the semantics of obligation. This results in a strengthening of the dominance ought
that is incompatible with maximin (just as expected utility reasoning is incompatible
with maximin reasoning in decision theory). For simplicity, we ignore other agents;
we have a single agent, α, making choices. We assume that α has finitely many
choices and that there are only finitely many relevant independent causal factors, so
both Choicemα and Statemα are finite.
Let us begin with Gambler (I) as depicted in Figs. 4 (without utilities) and 6 (with
utilities). Suppose that we have a coin toss with known probabilities 0.5 for Heads and
Tails. In the theory of decision under risk, a straightforward application of expected
utility reasoning yields a tie: gambling and not gambling have equal expected utility
(EU = 5). A similar analysis yields a tie for Gambler (II) as depicted in Fig. 5, where
the coin toss only occurs if α decides to gamble. But it is clear in these examples that
slight changes to the utilities would tip the decision one way or the other. To extend
Horty’s account to such cases, we need to add some concepts to utilitarian stit frames.
It suffices to add two additional concepts: outcomes and conditional chances.
We shall assume a finite set O1, . . ., On of outcomes of interest. These are propo-
sitions at moment m (subsets of Hm) that constitute a partition of Hm and which,
in conjunction with the background contexts and the agent’s choices, influence the
assignment of conditional chance and utility. In particular, they allow us to represent
probabilistic information about chance processes initiated by agents; such processes
cannot be treated as independent causal factors, as explained at the end of Sect. 3. In
Gambler, the outcomes may be described as {Win, Lose, Neither}.
For the conditional chance function on Hm , the simplest approach is to take
the underlying algebra23 of subsets of Hm to consist of all finite unions of sets
Ki ∧ S j ∧ Ok , where K1, . . ., Km are available acts, S1, . . ., SM are the background
contexts, and O1, . . ., On are the outcomes. Probabilistic information about chance
mechanisms is given by a conditional chance function P, assigning values P(Ok/Ki∧
S j ) that we take as primitive. P must satisfy the standard axioms of the probability
calculus. Since the algebra is finite, P need only be finitely additive.24
The following two assumptions would allow easy extension of Horty’s framework
to handle probabilistic choices:
(a) Uniform conditional chances. P(Ok/Ki ∧ S j ) is constant for each relevant
outcome O1, . . ., On within each Ki ∧ S j .
(b) Uniform utilities. V al(h) = V al(h′) for all h, h′ ∈ Ki ∧S j ∧ Ok , for all i, j, k.
23 An algebra of subsets of X is a family F of subsets that includes X and the empty set, and is
closed under finite unions, intersections and complementation.
24 The function P may, but need not, assign unconditional chances to elements of the algebra,
including α’s own actions. Since P represents objective chance, difficulties alleged to exist for the
assignment of subjective probabilities to one’s current choices are not relevant; see (Levi 1997) and
(Spohn 1977).
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Given these assumptions, we can “import” decision theory into the stit framework.
We can use expected utility maximization as the criterion for what agent α ought to
do at m, in simple cases such as Gambler (I) and (II).
But these assumptions need not always hold. First, assumption (a) might fail.
Some of the objective chances used in decision theory are not conditional chances
associated with chance mechanisms. For example, they may be derive from observed
frequencies. So there may be information about objective conditional chances that
is not represented in the stit framework. Second, assumption (b) might fail. Within
a single choice-state combination, we might find histories with different utilities
based (for example) on future choices by agents or future events. In general: if it is
impossible to find a set of outcomes satisfying (a) and (b), then it is impossible to apply
straightforward expected utility maximization. To keep matters simple, however, I
shall assume that condition (a) is satisfied but that (b) may fail.
This leads us to a definition of probabilistic utilitarian stit frames.
(28) A probabilistic utilitarian stit frame is a structure of the form.
< T ree, <, FACTOR, Rng, V alue, Outcome, P >,
where T ree,<, FACTOR, Rng and Value are as in Sects. 2, 3, and 4, Outcome
is a function that assigns to each moment m a partition {O1, . . ., On} of Hm and
P(·/·) is a conditional probability function that assigns a value P(Ok/Ki ∧ S j )
for each outcome Ok , choice Ki and state S j .25
A probabilistic utilitarian stit model combines a probabilistic utilitarian stit
frame with an assignment of truth values to propositions.
In order to formulate the concept of obligation in probabilistic utilitarian stit
frames, consider the following case (Fig. 8). In this example, the coin toss is an
independent factor and, as usual, Heads and Tails have fixed conditional chances of
0.5 regardless of whether α gambles. The outcomes are Win, Lose and Neither, but
this time the utilities of Win and Lose are not fixed (i.e., assumption (b) fails). So
there is no sharp value for the expected utility of gambling. Still, we can see that the
expected utility of gambling is at least (0.5)(9) + (0.5)(2) = 5.5, which exceeds the
expected utility of not gambling. Thus, we ought to gamble.
This motivates the following account of obligation, replacing dominance with
dominating expectation in the Horty semantics. We continue to assume that both
Choicemα and Statemα are finite.
25 One other assumption is necessary: the utilities given by Value (or Val) represent an interval
scale (i.e., they are unique up to a positive linear transformation). This assumption guarantees that
the expected utility ordering on choices, defined below, is invariant under allowable changes in
representation of the utilities. Consider Fig. 8 below, which depicts utilities assigned by a particular
function Val. The expected utility calculation given below, which shows that we ought to gamble,
fails if the agent’s utilities are equally well represented by a function Val ′ that assigns 7 to h1, 6 to
h2, and keeps all other values the same as Val. Although Val and Val ′ agree on their ordinal ranking
of histories, they are not related by a positive linear transformation. If Val ′ = aV al + b for a > 0,
however, then they induce the same ordering on choices.
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(29) Dominating expectation ordering (d and ≺d) on Choicemα .
If K and K ′ are members of Choicemα (i.e., possible choices for α at m), then
(1) K d K ′ if for all choices hjk, hjk ′ of histories in K∩S j∩Ok and K ′∩S j∩Ok
respectively, j,kV al(h jk)P(Ok/K ∧S j ) ≤ j,kV al(h jk ′)P(Ok/K ′∧S j );
and
(2) K ≺d K ′ if K d K ′ but not K ′ d K .
This principle says that act K ′ is better than act K if the expectation of K ′ dominates
the expectation of K.
Corresponding to this new ordering on choices, we have a new concept of obliga-
tion defined analogously to the earlier definitions (23) and (27). It states, roughly, that
Od [α csti t : A] if A is guaranteed by all choices whose expectation is not dominated.
(30) Dominating expectation ought, Od .
M, m/h |= Od [α csti t : A] iff for each choice K ∈ Choicemα that does
not guarantee A, there is a choice K ′ ∈ Choicemα such that (1) K ≺d K ′,
(2) M, m/h′ |= A for all h′ belonging to K ′, and (3) for every choice K ′′ ∈
Choicemα such that K ′ d K ′′, M, m/h′′ |= A for all h′′ belonging to K ′′.
It should be clear that Od is a strengthening of Horty’s , since K d K ′
whenever K  · K ′.26 On the other hand, just as we would expect, Od diverges
from the maximin ought Om . In the version of Gambler depicted by Fig. 8, we have
Od [α csti t : G] while Om[α csti t : ∼G].
26 Proof: if K ·K ′, then for any state Sj, V al(h) ≤ V al(h′) for each h ∈ K ∩ Sj and h′ ∈ K ′ ∩ S j .
Then k V al(h jk)P(Ok/K ∧S j ) ≤ k V al(h jk ′)P(Ok/K ′ ∧S j ) for all choices hjk ∈ K ∩S j ∩Ok
and h jk ′ ∈ K ′ ∩ S j ∩ Ok , and the result follows.
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Fig. 9 Matching pennies (a)












7 Game Theory and Mixed Strategies
Finally, I consider briefly how Horty’s account might be extended to handle oblig-
ations in the setting of game theory. To do this in general would introduce many
complications, including the need for separate Value functions to keep track of each
agent’s utilities.27 My interest here lies mainly in showing how we might use the
probabilistic utilitarian stit frames of the preceding section to make sense of mixed
strategies in game theory. For this reason, I limit the discussion to two-person zero-
sum games. The Value function represents α’s utilities, while utilities for the other
agent, β, are exactly the negative of α’s utilities. We initially assume that finitely
many choices—pure strategies in game theory—are available to both agents, and
that there are no additional independent causal factors. Thus, the background con-
texts in Statemα are simply β’s possible choices.
By way of motivation, notice that a very simple game, Matching Pennies (intro-
duced at the outset of this chapter), generates difficulties for Horty’s account. In
this game, both α and β simultaneously display a coin with one side up. If the two
displayed sides match (both Heads or both Tails), then β pays $1 to α; if the sides do
not match, then α pays $1 to β. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 9, with the stit and
game-theoretic representations side by side.
In this situation, neither choice by α is optimal. Consequently, on Horty’s account,
we then have neither [α csti t : Heads] nor [α csti t : T ails]. That is reasonable if
the only choices available are the pure strategies [Display] Heads or [Display]Tails.
But Horty’s conclusion is not plausible if we allow mixed strategies of the form
Display Heads with probability p and Display Tails with probability 1 – p, abbre-
viated as
[p Heads, (1 − p) Tails]
or more simply as
27 See Kooi and Tamminga (2008) for an account developed along these lines.
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Fig. 10 A zero-sum game
p Heads.
In game theory, this type of problem is solved by finding a Nash equilibrium: a
pair of choices such that neither player can do better by unilaterally changing his
or her choice. In Matching Pennies, there is a unique Nash equilibrium where both
agents adopt the mixed strategy: 1/2 Heads. This is the unique rational choice on
the assumption that each player has full knowledge of the game and adopts the
best possible strategy. In the remainder of this section, we suggest one way in which
Horty’s account can be expanded to accommodate mixed strategies, and then propose
a semantics that yields the obligation to adopt an equilibrium strategy.
But first let’s consider a preliminary question. How well does Horty’s account
fare if we limit ourselves to two-person zero-sum games with only pure strategies?
Consider the following game (Fig. 10), with utilities for α shown.
Here, α chooses between the left (A1) and right (A2) columns, while β chooses
between the top (B1) and bottom (B2) rows. From α’s point of view, neither choice
is dominant: A1 does better if β chooses B1, while A2 does better if β chooses
B2. So Horty’s “dominance ought” yields no obligation: neither [α csti t : A1] nor
[α csti t : A2] is true. However, both players will recognize that the top row is the
dominant choice for β (whose utilities are the negative of those in Fig. 10). Given that
β will choose B1, α ought to choose A1 (Indeed, A1 and B1 constitute the unique Nash
equilibrium for this game). This example shows that even without mixed strategies,
Horty’s dominance ought is inadequate for game theory.
One promising possibility might be the maximin ought (Om) of Sect. 5, which
combines dominance with maximin reasoning. Applied to Fig. 10, Om gives the
correct result: A1 guarantees the maximal minimum, so Om[α csti t : A1]. Further
encouragement comes from a standard result of game theory (Resnik 1987, p. 130):
Minimax equilibrium test. In a two-person zero-sum game, a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a pair of (pure) strategies to be in (Nash) equilibrium is that the payoff determined
by them equal the minimal value of its (column) and the maximal value of its (row).28 The
values for all such equilibrium pairs are the same.
It is easy to establish the following proposition:
28 Most expositions of game theory represent the utilities of the Row player in zero-sum games.
Following stit conventions, I represent instead the utilities of the column player. The statement of





Fig. 11 Another zero-sum game
(31) Proposition: If there is a pure-strategy equilibrium pair in a two-person zero-
sum game and if A is true at all non-dominated choices K for α that belong to
such an equilibrium pair, then Om[α csti t : A].
Proof:
For each such K , K ′ m K for all choices K ′; thus, these K are optimal with
respect to the ordering m and we have Om[α csti t : A].
(31) shows that whenever there is a pure Nash equilibrium, the maximin ought
correctly prescribes choices that are part of such an equilibrium.
Despite this success, maximin ought appears to overshoot the mark. It prescribes
choices even when there is no pure equilibrium. Consider the following example
(Fig.11). Here there are no dominant choices for either player and no equilibrium.
Nevertheless, maximin ought prescribes A2 for α and B1 for β, since these choices
maximize minimal utility.
It might be interesting to consider whether there is any merit to these prescrip-
tions. It might also be worth investigating whether there is a notion of obligation,
intermediate in strength between  and Om , that corresponds precisely to acts that
comprise a Nash equilibrium. I pass over such investigations for the following rea-
son: once we allow mixed strategies, the problem of capturing Nash equilibria with
a Horty-style account of obligation is solved through an interesting combination of
maximin reasoning and the weak concept of expected utility introduced in Sect. 6.
The first task is to give an analysis of mixed strategies. In game theory, a mixed
strategy is commonly characterized as the use of a chance mechanism to select a
pure strategy, followed by acting on the selected strategy. The details may not matter
much in game theory, but they matter a great deal in the stit framework. If the chance
mechanism operates at a moment prior to the choice of the pure strategy, then the
analysis of a mixed strategy will involve both the prior moment when the mechanism
operates and alternative later moments at which the agent chooses a pure strategy.
To make things worse, the stit picture for the later moment will be identical to the
original ‘pure strategy’ picture. If we evaluate the obligation at that later moment, it
is unclear how the earlier operation of a chance mechanism can make any difference.
Perhaps the simplest approach, and the one which will be adopted here, is to
represent each available mixed strategy as a separate choice existing at the same
moment as the pure strategies. It is the choice of a chance mechanism whose possible
outcomes are identical in structure with the pure strategies. Strictly speaking, this
Decisions in Branching Time 53
























analysis requires that we modify Choicemα by adding one additional choice for each
available chance distribution over the (finitely many) pure strategies. In practice,
it usually suffices to represent all of the pure strategies plus a single choice that
stands for an arbitrary mixed strategy (incorporating probabilistic parameters) or, on
occasion, for a particular mixed strategy. Figure 12 illustrates Matching Pennies with
mixed strategies. Dotted lines are used to separate outcomes for the case of choices
that involve chance mechanisms.
None of the concepts of obligation described above gives the correct result here,
namely, the obligation to choose 1/2 Heads. According to the dominance ought, there
are no obligations. The same is true for the maximin ought, since each choice has the
same worst case. The dominating expectation ought is not even defined for settings
involving multiple agents.
A helpful way to obtain the right choice ordering and the right concept of oblig-
ation is to exploit a well-known result from game theory (Resnik 1987, p. 136):
Maximin Theorem for two-person zero-sum games.
For every two-person zero-sum game there is at least one strategy (mixed or pure) for Row
and at least one strategy for Col that form an equilibrium pair. If there is more than one such
pair, their expected utilities are equal.
The expected utility for the equilibrium pair is referred to as the security level for
both players because, by playing the equilibrium strategy, each player maximizes
his or her minimum expected utility. The security level in Matching Pennies is 1/2,
which can be guaranteed by playing 1/2 Heads. In contrast to our earlier discussion
of zero-sum games with pure strategies, the inclusion of mixed strategies ensures the
existence of an equilibrium.
The right ordering, then, is that one mixed strategy is preferable to another if
its minimal expected utility exceeds that of the other. This ordering can be defined
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within the setting of probabilistic utilitarian stit frames. Write Pα and Pβ for α’s
and β’s choice of mixed strategy. Pα and Pβ are probability distributions over the
choices available to α and β, respectively. That is, if K1, . . ., Km are the available
pure strategies for α, i.e., the members of Choicemα , then Pα(Ki ) = pi with pi = 1;
similarly, Pβ(B j ) = q j for pure strategies B1, . . ., Bn . The choice of a pure strategy
Ki or B j is just the special case where pi = 1 or q j = 1. Let ∗Choicemα be the set of
mixed strategies Pα based on the pure strategies in Choicemα .
(32) Equilibrium ordering (e and ≺e) on ∗Choicemα .
If Pα and P ′α are members of ∗Choicemα (i.e., mixed strategies for α at m), then
(1) Pα e P ′α if
inf{i,jV al(hi j )Pα(Ki )Pβ(B j )/hi j ∈ Ki ∩ B j and Pβ a mixed strategy for
β} ≤ inf{i,jV al(hi j )P ′α(Ki )Pβ(B j )/hi j ∈ Ki ∩ B j and Pβ a mixed strat-
egy for β};
and
(2) Pα ≺e P ′α if Pα e P ′α but not P ′α e Pα.
The mixed strategy P ′α is better than Pα if it has greater minimal expected utility. The
ordering e is admissible in the following special sense: if Pα · P ′α where both Pα
and P ′α are pure strategies, then Pα e P ′α.29
(33) Equilibrium ought, Oe.
M, m/h |= Oe[α csti t : A] iff for each Pα ∈ ∗Choicemα that does not guarantee
A, there is a P ′α ∈ ∗Choicemα such that (1) Pα ≺e P ′α, (2) M, m/h′ |= A for
all h′ belonging to P ′α, and (3) for every P ′′α ∈ ∗Choicemα such that P ′α e
P ′′α , M, m/h′′ |= A for all h′′ belonging to P ′′α .
In two-person zero-sum games where an equilibrium exists, (33) states that
Oe[α csti t : A] if A is guaranteed by all equilibrium mixed strategies. Oe is a strength-
ening of Horty’s , and it gives the right answer in the case of Matching Pennies:
Oe[α csti t : P1/2].
Summarizing: mixed strategies can be defined in Horty’s framework, and we can
give an ordering on mixed strategies that yields the correct account of what agents
ought to do in two-person zero-sum games. Extending these ideas to games involving
more than two agents and to cooperative games may or may not be feasible.
8 Conclusion
Horty observes that his account of obligation “closes the gap” between deontic logic
and act utilitarianism. That gap existed so long as deontic logic was viewed as an
29 Proof: Pα(Ki ) = 1 for some i, and P ′α(Ki ′ ) = 1 for some i′. If Pα · P ′α, then V al(hij) ≤ V al(hi′j)
for any hij in Ki ∩ B j and hi′j in Ki′ ∩ Bj. From this it follows that Pα e P ′α.
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account of classifying states of affairs as right or wrong, while utilitarianism was
concerned with classifying actions. Horty’s dominance ought clearly goes a long
way towards closing another gap as well: the one between deontic logic and decision
theory.
Because of the weakness of dominance reasoning, however, Horty’s account
seems of limited value as a theory of choice. This chapter suggests how, with mod-
est extensions, Horty’s framework can move beyond dominance into the three main
branches of the theory of decision: decisions under ignorance, decisions under risk
and game theory. This leads to a motivational question: what is the point of trying to
bring deontic logic “up to speed” if we already have a successful decision theory? I
close by suggesting two main ways in which deontic logic provides return benefits
for decision theory.
The first, noted at the outset of this chapter, is by offering rigorous analysis of
foundational notions: causation, choice, counterfactuals and background states. That
such analyses matter should be clear to anyone who has followed the history of deci-
sion theory as formulated by Savage, modified by Jeffrey, and re-formulated by causal
decision theorists. For example, we claimed here that the states of decision theory
are causal background contexts and provided an analysis of causal independence and
background contexts within stit models. By contrast, Joyce (1999, 61) writes that
states include all “aspects of the world that lie outside the decision maker’s control”.
He tells us that future choices and events, if relevant to our present decision problem,
must be incorporated into the background states for that decision. Now it is harm-
less to incorporate future choices and events into the background states if they are
causally independent of the agent’s present choice, but not so harmless if their future
occurrence is contingent upon present choices. Stit frames take care of this automat-
ically: histories belonging to distinct states at m must be divided at m. This rules
out treating future choices or processes as constituents of states at m. Future chance
processes must be incorporated into decisions via conditional chances for outcomes
(as described in Sect. 6). To handle sequential choices in the stit framework requires
something like Horty’s strategic ought (2001, Chap. 7), which takes us beyond the
present discussion.
As a second benefit, deontic logic offers a model for thinking about problems
where decision theory and game theory cannot offer clear, uncontroversial solutions.
One source of such problems is infinite decision theory, comprising decision prob-
lems in which an agent has to deal with infinite utilities, an infinity of possible acts, or
both.30 Some of these problems are genuinely paradoxical and have no clear solution.
In other cases, however, there are clear prescriptions, yet decision theory is silent
because there is no optimal act. Because deontic logic is concerned with the truth of
obligation sentences O[α csti t : A] even where A does not describe an act, it has the
resources to offer advice in such cases.
One example of this kind, noted earlier, is the greatest integer game. Decision
theory cannot recommend the choice of any particular integer, but our deontic log-
ics tell us that [α csti t : An] and Om[α csti t : An] where An is the proposition “α
30 See (Sorensen 1994) for examples.
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chooses an integer larger than n”. As a similar example, imagine that α is a perfec-
tionist attempting to finish a journal article. Suppose that α represents his position
to himself as an infinite choice situation where A0 stands for not submitting the
chapter at all, A1 for submitting the current version as is, and A2, A3, . . . for produc-
ing and submitting polished versions, each An+1 slightly better than An . Suppose
that all of the relevant utilities are bounded above by some fixed limit. In such a
case, no act An is optimal. But our deontic logics still give us [α csti t : ∼A0] and
Om[α csti t : ∼A0], representing the obligation to submit the chapter.
Decision theory need not always be concerned about the metaphysical details of
choice, or the precise characterization of the acts and background states needed to
specify a decision problem. But at the boundaries of decision theory, where those
details matter, stit-based deontic logic, made possible thanks to Belnap’s rigorous
analysis of agency, provides a wonderful resource.
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